

From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO
dated 11 March 1946, 1000-1200 hours (page 1)

- Q. Who would be considered responsible, who would you consider responsible for the composition of that note?
- A. That notification, as I have previously explained, was a summation of the results of the studies and discussions which took place at the liaison conferences regarding negotiations with the United States. The note itself was written by the Foreign Office, but the responsibility for the composition rests with the participating members of the liaison conferences. The responsibility for the contents of the notification rests with the members of the liaison conferences. Furthermore, the matter was also reported to the Cabinet and passed the Cabinet without objection.
- Q. Could you give me the names of the individuals at the liaison conferences and the Cabinet members who would be considered responsible for the contents of the note?
- A. As I have said at a previous meeting, members of a liaison conference who were responsible for the study and discussions on the matter were TOJO, SHIMADA, SUGIYAMA, NAGANO, TSUKADA, ITO, KAYA, SUZUKI, and the three secretaries, HOSHINO, MUTO and OKA. As to the members of the Cabinet, under the constitution they are responsible for decisions of the Cabinet, even on matters outside of the competence of their respective offices.

From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO
dated 11 March 1946, 1000-1200 hours (page 3)

- Q. I understood from you that the note was composed by the Foreign Office after the contents of what the note should contain had been decided upon at the liaison conferences. I also understand that after the note was composed by the Foreign Office it was presented for approval to the Cabinet on December 1, 1941, at which time the Cabinet approved it. Is my understanding correct?
- A. The first part of your understanding is correct, that is, that the writing of the note took place in accordance with the decision of the liaison conference as to its contents. However, I should like to make some correction as to the date. December 1 was the date of the Imperial Conference, at which the decision for war was made. However, previous to the Imperial Conference the main points of the note to be sent were reported to the Cabinet; but as to the drafting of the note, that came afterwards, and at a later Cabinet meeting the main points were further explained and the continuation of the explanation that was made at the former Cabinet meeting. I cannot recall definitely, but it seems to be around November 30, but I could have the date more definitely confirmed later.

From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO
dated 11 March 1946, 1000-1200 hours
(bottom of page 4 and top of page 5)

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- Q. From what you have stated would you consider that the members of the Cabinet and members of the liaison conference, whose names you have mentioned, are equally responsible with you as regards to the contents of the note and its delivery?
- A. As to the contents of the note, I think it is but natural that all the members of the liaison conference are responsible. As to the Cabinet, they would have at least a final responsibility in that they expressed no objection, that is, from the legal point of view. Of course, it all depends whether you view the matter superficially or formally, or whether you would like to view it more profoundly. But, practically speaking, in the light of actualities it might be said that there is a difference in the degree of responsibility by the liaison conference and the Cabinet because not all the Cabinet members attended the liaison conference, but the situation was such that whatever was approved by the liaison conference was approved by the Cabinet. Although there may be a difference in degree of responsibility, the Cabinet might have at least a nominal responsibility.
- Q. Who knew and approved of the details concerning the manner of the delivery of the note?
- A. As to the delivery of the note, instructions were sent previously to the Embassy in Washington stating that it was to be delivered at 1:00 PM, December 7, Washington time, as much as possible to the Secretary of State, and that all preparations be made for the purpose of delivering the note at the specified time. The instructions themselves were dispatched by the Chief of the Cable Section of the Foreign Office. Regarding the sending of such instructions, all members of the liaison conference knew. It is naturally a matter on which there should be no objections, and, therefore, it was approved as a matter of course.

From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO
dated 11 March 1946, 1000-1200 hours
(bottom of page 5 and top of page 6)

- Q. Why was England not advised of declaration of war?
- A. In the latter stages of the negotiations, when I became Foreign Minister, our relations with Britain were naturally considered. As a matter of fact, in case understanding was reached with the United States, agreements with Britain, the Netherlands, and other countries concerned would be necessary. Therefore, inquiry was made of the United States government on this matter. Regarding this point the Secretary of State informed Ambassador NOMURA that such matters would be handled by the United States and that the United States government would duly inform Britain and the other countries concerned. That being the case, it was not considered necessary to make any notification in London, since it would be going from Washington. However, on the morning of December 8, Tokyo time, shortly after the visit of Ambassador GREW at 7:00 AM, I asked for the visit of Ambassador CRAGIE of Britain. At that time I informed the British Ambassador the results of our negotiations with the United States and for reference gave him a copy of the Japanese note to the United States. Thereafter, around noon, the British Ambassador was duly notified, in writing, that a state of war existed between Japan and Britain. And, as I recall it, that notification was delivered before the commencement of hostilities with Great Britain.

Doc. No. 4115

Shigenori TOGO

11 March 1946
1000-1200 hours

Certificate of Stenographer:

I, Mildred Rich, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out herewith, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Mildred Rich

Certificate of Interrogator:

I, Roy L. Morgan, certify that on 11 March 1946 Shigenori TOGO personally gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth herein.

/s/ Roy L. Morgan

九四六年三月十一日(午時)月十三時(附)東郷茂徳
ノ顧問書ヨリノ抜萃

RETURN TO ROOM 361

4/15

問 ソノ覚書ノ作成ニ當ツテ誰ガ責任者デアルト考ヘラ
レカ、虫良ハ誰ト思フカ?

答 先ニ私が説明シタヤラニア、通告ニ合衆口ト、交
渉ニ関スル連絡会議ニ於テ討議研究ニタ結
果ノ要典デアツタ。覚書ソノモ、ハ外務省ニヨリテ
書カレタガ、作成ノ責任ハ連絡会議ニ參與シ
タ人々ニアル。

4/207

ソノ覚書ノ内容ニ対スル責任ハ連絡会議
員ニカ、ツテナル。

更ニ、コノ問題ハ閣議ニモ附シ異議無ク閣
議ヲ通過シタ。

4/6

問 コノ覚書ノ内容ニ主責任アリト思ハレシ連絡
会議々員及閣員個々ノ名前ヲ擧ゲラレカ?

答 先ノ金見ニ於テモ云ツタヤラニソノ問題ニツイテ
研究・討議ニ責任アル連絡会議々員ハ

東條、島田、杉山、永野、塚田、伊藤、賀屋、
鈴木、及三名、書記官星野、武蔵、岡デ
也。閣員ニ関ニテハ、彼等ハ、憲法上、閣議
決定ニ對シテ、假令其レが閣員、擔當以外、
事項デアツテモ之ニ對シテ責任ガアル。

一九四六年三月十一日(一。一。三附)

東郷茂徳、訓問書ヨリ

4/15

問、

私、貴方ニ伺ヒテ、ソノ覚書ガ、ソレニ含まレ
ルベキ内容ガ連絡会議デ決定サレタ後、
外務省デ作成サレタモノデアルト解釈シタ。
同時ニ私ハ覚書ガ外務省ニヨツテ作成サレ
タ後、一九四一年/昭和十六年/十二月一日
承諾ヲ得ルタ閣議ニ提出サレ、ソシテ、
此閣議ガ之ヲ認可シタト解釈シタ。私
ノ解釈ニ同意シタ。

答、

貴方ノ解釈、最初ノ部分正シイ、即チ
覚書作成ハソノ内容ニ関シテハ連絡会
議ノ決定事項ニ從ツテ爲サレタ。

併シ、日附ニ関シテ、多少訂正シタ。

十二月一日ハ、閣議ヲ決定シタ事前会議
ノ日デアッタ。之カハ事前会議ノ行ハル前
ニ送ラルベキ覚書ノ主要項目ハ閣議ニ報

No 3.

4115

告サレタ。シカニ覚書ノ起草ニ関シテハッ
シ、後ニサレシノ後閣議ニ於テ、主要ナル
ハ更ニ説明サシ、前回閣議ニ於テサレタ
説明が継続サレタ。此ハバツキリ思出ストハ思
来ナリガ、多分十二月三十日頃ダツタと思
フ。シカニ此ノ日附ハ後デバツキリ調べる
事が出来る。

No 4

一九四六年三月十一日(一〇時—一二時)附

東郷茂徳ノ言内書ヨリ

4/15

問、貴方が陳述したところ、貴方が名指した所、閣議各員及連絡会議各員へ、貴方と同等三覚書の内容及交付ニ関する責任アリと思ふ。

答 覚書内容ニ関する連絡会議各員全員ニ責任アルト云極當然デアルと思ふ。閣議ニ関するハ彼等ハ少クモ何ラノ反対ヲ示サナカッタコトヲ取後、責任がアルデアラウ。即チ法律的見地ヨリ云ベデアル。又論じハ、貴方がソノ問題ヲ皮相的ニ若シハ形勢的ニ見ルハ或ハソレヨリ深ク見ルカニカ、ツデナシモノナリ。ナシト云實ニ虚ニテ實際的ニ云ベ連絡会議ニ責任ト、閣議ニ責任トノ間ニ程度ノ差ガアルト云ヒ得ルと思フ。セテラベ閣員スベテガ連絡会議ニ臨ミタデテイカラザアルニカシキ事態ガ事態デアツタカラ

4/5

連絡会議で可決せしむコトハ何ニヨラズ
議でモ可決せしむデアリタ。責任ノ程度
ニ差コソアルカモシナイガ、商議モソウトモ名
義上ノ責任ナルト思フ。

4115

問

覚書交付ノ方法ニ関スル詳細ハ誰ガ知ツテ中
タカ、又誰ノ同意ヲ得タカ。

答

覚書、交付ニ関シテハ豫メワシントニ於ケ
ル大使館ニ訓示ガ發せられ、即チワシントニ於
刻十二月七日午後一時ニ覚書が成ルベク國務
長官宛ニ渡サレルコト及び指定時刻ニリノ覚
書ヲ交付スル目的ノタメ、凡テノ準備ガナシ
ルコトト云フデアル。訓示ソモ、ハ外務省海陸
電信課長ニヨリテ發送サレタ。此ノ訓示發送
ニ関シテハ連絡會議ノ全員ガ承知ニ在リ、
当然反對スベキ事柄デバク故ニ当前ノ事ト
シテ同意サシタワケデアル。

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一九四六年三月十一日(二。一。二時)付

東郷茂徳ノ訓問書ヨリ

41/5

答 問

何故英口ハ宣戦ニ就テ通告サレナカッタカ。
交渉、後段ニ至リ、私が外務大臣ニツタ当時、
我口ノ対英関係ハ自然考慮サレタ。實際
ノ問題トシテ、合衆口トノ解が成レシ場合
合ニ、英、蘭、他関係諸口ト、協定が
必要トツテ来ルソゴデ、コノ問題ニ関シテ、
アメリカニ照会サレタ。コノ英ニ関シテ、口務長
官ハ野村大使ニ斯ル問題ハ、合衆口が
取扱フシ又合衆口政府が正式ニ英口及
関係諸口ニ通告スルデアラウト告ゲタ。
斯ク云フ事情デアツタノデ、ワシントン
ヲ通告ガ行クコトシテ、ロンドンニ、何
ノ通告ヲ發スル必要モナイト考ヘラレシ
居タ。コノシテ、東京時刻十二月八日
朝、ブル大使、十年前七時訪問、直

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後、英曰、「ワシ」ギ一大使、来訪ヲ請フ
 タ。ソ、時私ハ、英曰大使ニ合衆口トノ交
 渉ノ結果ニ就テ知ラセ、尙参考ノタ
 メ日本ノ合衆口ニ対スル覚書、寫シ
 フ彼ニ渡シタ。

ソノ後、正午頃、英曰大使ハ正式ニ文書
 ニヨッタ、日英ハ戦争状態ニアルコトヲ通
 告サシタ。

ソニテ私ノ記憶スル所デハ、英曰ト戦
 端ヲ交ヘル前ニッ、通告ガ渡サシタト思
 フ。

4115

東郷茂徳

一九四六年三月十日 十時—十一時

速記者、証明書

私ニリッドリックハ、茲ニ陳述セラシク、
私が速記者、役目ヲ勤メタコト、私が前記質問
及答辭ヲ轉寫シタコト、及右轉寫ハ私ノ知識
並ニ信念ノ範圍内ニ於テ眞實ナルト共ニ
正確ナルコトヲ茲ニ証明シマス。

署名ニリッドリック

証記者、証明書

私、ロイス・モーガンハ東郷茂徳が一九四六年
三月十日 茲ニ陳述セラシク、數個ノ質問ニ對シテ
自ラ前記答辭ヲ爲シタコトヲ証明シマス。

署名ロイス・モーガン